Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a technique for process safety analysis and risk evaluation, aimed at assessing scenarios with significant consequences across various processes. By examining the potential for hazard occurrence, the chance of safeguard failure, and the severity of potential outcomes identified through hazard identification efforts, LOPA is crucial for determining whether the risks associated with high-consequence situations are aligned with a company's tolerance for risk.
The concept that sits behind LOPA is the recognition that there will always be some level of risk in the high hazard industries and that there is not infinite resource available. The technique therefore challenges operating companies to understand "how safe do we need to be?" and "have we achieved this?" LOPA can also feed into other assessments such as COMAH Risk Assessment, Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA), Occupied Buildings Risk Assessment (OBRA) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements.
Our facilitators have worked with the LOPA process for decades, across all industry sectors, and can assist you with the following:
If you require assistance in performing LOPA then please get in touch today to discuss your requirements.
The study works on the principal that there should be multiple layers of protection which stand between a process upset and a hazardous event. LOPA assesses these layers and challenges
One key concept is that of independent protection layers (IPL's). To qualify as an IPL the protection must be.
The study can be used for SIL Determination of a safety instrumented function. When used for this purpose we aim to understand.
Obtain an initiating event related to a potential hazard from a process hazard analysis study such as HAZID or HAZOP.
Analyse the potential consequences if the scenario unfolds, including harm to people and, if required, environmental harm.
For the given outcome, what level of risk are we willing to tolerate.
Identify how often (times per year) that the initiating event will occur.
Using the rules of independent, auditable and effective, identify relevant Independent Protection Layers along with their probabilities of failure upon demand (PFD).
The risk might be reduced by conditional modifiers - e.g. probabilities of ignition, harm, presence. Identify these along with relevant probabilities.
By multiplying the relevant initiating event frequencies along with probabilities of IPL failure and conditional modifiers, the risk is calculated as number of events / year.
Compare the target risk with the measured risk to establish if a gap exists. Use the outputs to understand if additional layers of protection are required.