01971558279

Process Safety Consulting
Process Safety Consulting
  • Home
  • Consultancy
    • Hydrogen Consulting
    • Functional Safety
    • Hazard and Risk
    • COMAH Consulting
    • DSEAR Consulting
    • Process Safety Management
    • Mentoring
    • Technical Due Diligence
  • Hazard Studies
    • HAZOP
    • LOPA
    • QRA - Risk Assessment
    • Occupied Buildings
    • Major Accident Hazards
    • HAZID
  • Training
  • Intelligent Customer
  • Contact Us
  • More
    • Home
    • Consultancy
      • Hydrogen Consulting
      • Functional Safety
      • Hazard and Risk
      • COMAH Consulting
      • DSEAR Consulting
      • Process Safety Management
      • Mentoring
      • Technical Due Diligence
    • Hazard Studies
      • HAZOP
      • LOPA
      • QRA - Risk Assessment
      • Occupied Buildings
      • Major Accident Hazards
      • HAZID
    • Training
    • Intelligent Customer
    • Contact Us

01971558279


  • Home
  • Consultancy
    • Hydrogen Consulting
    • Functional Safety
    • Hazard and Risk
    • COMAH Consulting
    • DSEAR Consulting
    • Process Safety Management
    • Mentoring
    • Technical Due Diligence
  • Hazard Studies
    • HAZOP
    • LOPA
    • QRA - Risk Assessment
    • Occupied Buildings
    • Major Accident Hazards
    • HAZID
  • Training
  • Intelligent Customer
  • Contact Us

HAZOP Studies

HAZOP Facilitators

Process Safety Consulting is a provider of industrial process safety and Hazard and Operability study leadership. Our IChemE-certified HAZOP Chair / HAZOP facilitators  have the depth of experience, knowledge and skill to lead hazard studies across a wide range of high hazard industries and have facilitated countless studies ranging from small studies through to 6 month projects. 


At Process Safety Consulting we can help with. 


  • Provision of a HAZOP Facilitator / HAZOP Leader
  • Re-reviews and Delta HAZOP's.
  • Advise on whether alternate techniques are more appropriate. 
  • Peer review your HAZOP's.
  • Coach and Mentor your study facilitators. 


To get in touch with us click the button below or, if you just want to find more out then continue reading. 


Request a Quote

What is HAZOP?

HAZOP stands for Hazard and Operability Study. It is a systematic and structured form of process hazard analysis (PHA) used to identify potential hazards, assess risks, and analyse deviations in process systems and designs. The primary aim of the hazard study is to identify and mitigate risks that could potentially lead to accidents or impact the operability of a process. It is a part of the 6 stage hazard study process as developed by ICI and is sometimes termed Hazard Study 3 (HS3). 

Importance of HAZOP Analysis

HAZOP analysis is crucial in ensuring process safety and reducing the likelihood of catastrophic accidents or incidents in industries involving complex processes. By systematically identifying hazards and evaluating their potential consequences the study helps eliminate or control these risks effectively. It also aids in optimising the operability and reliability of a process design, leading to improved safety and efficiency. 

How to Perform a HAZOP Study

Hazard Study 3 Process

 Hazard Study 3 follows a systematic approach, typically involving the following steps:


  1. Define the scope and objectives: Clearly define the system or process to be analysed, its boundaries, and the goals of the study.
  2. Assemble a multidisciplinary team: Form a team comprising individuals with expertise in design, operations, maintenance, safety, and other relevant areas. This team will be responsible for selecting the nodes.
  3. Prepare the process documentation: Gather and review all necessary information about the process, including P&IDs (Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams), process flow diagrams, operating procedures, and design intent.
  4. Select HAZOP nodes: In the study, identify the specific process nodes (equipment, components, or sections) to be analysed.
  5. Define and apply guidewords: Apply a set of predefined guidewords (such as "more," "less," "other than," etc.) to systematically explore potential deviations and their consequences at each selected node.
  6. Brainstorm and identify hazards: With the help of guidewords, the team brainstorms possible deviations from the design intent at each selected node and identifies potential hazards associated with each deviation.
  7. Analyse consequences and evaluate risk: Assess the consequences of identified hazards and, if required, evaluate their potential risks. 
  8. Propose actions and manage them: Develop appropriate actions to control or mitigate identified hazards for each selected node. Establish an action management system to track the progress of implementing those actions, specific to each node.
  9. Document the findings: Record all findings from the study, including identified hazards, proposed actions for each selected node, and any recommendations.
  10. Review and follow-up: Regularly review the progress of action implementation, specific to each selected node, and conduct periodic re-reviews to ensure the ongoing effectiveness of the study.

Hazard Study Leader

Hazard and Operability Study - Guidewords and Outputs

Guideword examples

Guideword examples

Guideword examples

Hazard and Operability Study Guidewords

 Guidewords play a crucial role in the HAZOP process. They help systematically identify potential deviations and hazards. The commonly used guidewords are:


  1. No: Absence of something that should be present.
  2. More: An increase in the quantity or rate beyond the design intent.
  3. Less: A decrease in the quantity or rate below the design intent.
  4. As well as: Addition of something not in the original design.
  5. Part of: Division of a component or system.
  6. Reverse: Reversal of a direction or flow.


Using these guidewords, specific process parameters are examined to identify potential deviations and hazards.

HAZOP example

Guideword examples

Guideword examples

HAZOP example

 HAZOP example - the outputs of a Hazard Study 3 (HS3) typically include:


  1. Deviation List: This is a comprehensive list of all deviations or potential process abnormalities identified during the study. Each deviation is described, along with its severity and potential consequences.
  2. Actions List: This list comprises the recommended actions or measures to mitigate or eliminate the identified deviations. Each action should be clearly defined, assigned to responsible individuals, and accompanied by a target completion date.
  3. Report: A detailed report documenting the findings, analysis, and conclusions of the study. It typically includes the process description, study methodology, identified deviations, recommended actions, and any supporting information or Piping and Instrumentation diagrams (P+ID's) with nodes marked up. 


HAZOP Analysis - Anything else?

When should a HAZOP be done?

The study should be performed during the early stages of a project when the detailed design or redesign is known. It is also advisable to conduct the study whenever there are significant changes to an existing process, such as modifications or updates. Performing the study early on helps identify potential hazards and allows for their effective mitigation and control before they become embedded in the design, reducing the need for costly rework or modifications later in the project lifecycle.  It is essential that before moving to the study, the design already determined and fixed, and fully represented in the form of a Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID). The following information should be available (where relevant). 


  • Hazardous material properties including chemical reaction hazard data, flammability, toxicity, explosivity. 
  • Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P+ID's)
  • Process Description. 
  • Process Instructions. 
  • Equipment Design Specifications.
  • Outputs from Hazard Study 1 (HS1) and Hazard Study 2 (HS2). 
  • Basis of Safety. 
  • Industry experience, incidents and recognised good practice. 

We've completed our hazard study - what next?

As with other forms of hazard analysis, it is a cyclical activity that requires regular re-reviews in order to maintain its effectiveness. This cyclical nature allows for the identification of any changes that have occurred since the initial review and the implementation of any necessary corrective action. Re-reviews of studies are critical in order to ensure that any incremental changes are accounted for, and that the safety objectives are still achievable. The importance of these re-reviews cannot be overstated, as a failure to identify and address any changes can lead to significant safety risks. Re-reviews should be conducted regularly, and should focus on any changes in the process, equipment or personnel that may have occurred since the last review. It is also important to account for any changes in the regulatory environment or applicable standards. 


Hazard Studies - Online or in person?

This is largely personal preference and there are pros and cons to both options. In person workshops create better team rapport and enables the facilitator to engage more effectively with all participants. Online workshops can bring together teams from diverse locations in a cost effective manner and allow for shorter, focussed sessions. Costs are also reduced due to lack of travel and expenses. 

Where teams are unfamiliar with each other, or benefits can be gained from viewing an already constructed plant, then in person workshops are generally better. This can move to remote studies when teams’ members are familiar or the systems are sufficiently simple to be studies remotely.  

Frequently Asked Questions

Please reach us at info@processsafetyconsulting.com if you cannot find an answer to your question.

Advantages

  • Systematically identifies potential hazards and risks in a process.
  • Helps optimize process safety and prevent accidents or incidents.
  • Promotes proactive risk management and mitigation strategies.
  • Enhances the reliability and operability of process designs.
  • Facilitates compliance with process safety management standards and regulations.

Disadvantages

  • Requires a multidisciplinary team of experts, which can be time-consuming and expensive.
  • Relies on the expertise and experience of the team members.
  • May not uncover all potential hazards and risks, as it relies on human discretion.
  • Can generate a large number of recommended actions, which need to be managed effectively to ensure proper resolution.


HAZOP is a more comprehensive and detailed analysis technique. It systematically examines potential hazards, deviations, and their consequences using guidewords, assessing risks and generating action items to mitigate them. A focus is not only on hazards but also on the operability of the process.


HAZID, on the other hand, is a more simplified and less structured hazard identification technique. It aims to identify potential hazards and their consequences without the systematic exploration of process deviations. HAZID is commonly used during the early stages of a project to provide a broad understanding of potential risks and is sometimes termed a hazard study 2 (HS2).


Delta HAZOP is a powerful process hazard analysis tool that can help identify potential hazards in an operating facility that has already been subject to conventional studies and periodic revalidation. This unique approach focuses on changes that have occurred over time, helping to uncover any previously undetected 'creeping change' that could be putting the facility at risk. 


When it comes to estimating the duration of a study, it's not an exact science - it is highly dependent upon the methodology, complexity of the process, number of nodes, dynamics of the group and whether risk ranking will be performed. 


There is no prescriptive requirement for this although it is considered to be recognised good practice. Independent facilitators are in a better position to challenge the design and any surrounding assumptions. 


This largely depends upon the scale of the hazard, complexity of the process and whether the plant and process is novel. Depending on a range of factors, the following studies can be used to replace or supplement a hazard study 3. 

  • Checklists.
  • HAZID
  • What if.
  • HAZOP "by difference".
  • Design code review.
  • Task Analysis.
  • Job Safety Analysis.
  • Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA).
  • Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA).
  • Fault Trees.


Copyright © 2025 Process Safety Consulting Limited - All Rights Reserved.

Powered by

  • Privacy Policy

This website uses cookies.

We use cookies to analyze website traffic and optimize your website experience. By accepting our use of cookies, your data will be aggregated with all other user data.

DeclineAccept